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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of
moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation
among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his repu-
tation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This,
however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social
norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open
question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while
enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we
address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct
social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on
the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest coop-
erative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever coop-
erates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a
pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.
Author Summary
The prevalence of cooperation among human societies is a puzzle that has caught the eye
of researchers from multiple fields. Why is that people are selfless and often incur costs to
aid others? Reputations are intimately linked with the answer to this question, and so are
the social norms that dictate what is reckoned as a good or a bad action. Here we present a
mathematical framework to analyze the relationship between different social norms and
the sustainability of cooperation, in populations of arbitrary sizes. Indeed, it is known that
cooperation, norms, reciprocity and the art of managing reputations, are features that go
along with humans from their pre-historic existence in small-scale societies to the contem-
porary times, when technology supports the interaction with a large number of people.
We show that population size is relevant when evaluating the merits of each social norm
and conclude that there is a social norm especially effective in leveraging cooperation in
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small populations. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good
individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation.
Introduction
Indirect Reciprocity (IR), which involves reputation and status [1], constitutes, perhaps, the
most elaborated and cognitively demanding mechanism of cooperation discovered so-far [2].
Unlike other mechanisms of cooperation, IR has been heralded as providing the biological
basis of our morality [1]. Whereas under direct reciprocity one expects to receive help from
someone we have helped before, under IR one expects a return, not from someone we helped,
but from someone else: In this sense, helping the “right” individuals may increase the chance of
being helped by someone else at a later stage.
Seminal work carried out since the mid eighties [1–35] has shown how IR can lead to the
emergence and sustainability of cooperation. Most theoretical models employed to date (for
exceptions, see [10,26]) have considered infinite populations. In this context, the work of Oht-
suki and Iwasa [13] became an inspiring and influential framework on top of which many
other models were built, and led to the identification of the so-called leading eight social norms
of cooperation [13–15].
But what about small-scale societies, e.g., Hunter-Gatherers where reputation is paramount
[36,37]? Indeed, and despite other forms of reciprocity or kinship relations that may also play a
co-evolutionary role, reputations easily diffuse in small communities and influence individuals’
choices. In this context, it remains an open question which norms are able to promote coopera-
tion in small societies. Here we shall investigate to which extent norms found to promote coop-
eration in large populations will remain effective in small societies, and also to which extent the
capacity of a social norm to foster cooperation depends on the community size.
In small populations, stochastic finite size effects are not only important, but may even ren-
der analyses based on concepts originating from infinite populations misleading. In the context
of direct reciprocity, for instance, it was shown that individuals in finite populations select
reciprocation, while defection is selected in infinite populations [38]. In general, it is also well-
known that strict Nash Equilibria and Evolutionary Stable Strategies may not prevail in finite
populations [39,40,41,42]. In this paper we address this problem by studying the stochastic
dynamics of different strategies (also called action or behavioral rules) when reputation assign-
ment is governed by second order social norms (defined below).
Consider a finite population comprised of Z individuals who may opt to help one another
(that is, to Cooperate, C) or not (to Defect, D). Random pairs of individuals are chosen and
play the donation game, one being the potential provider of help (donor) to the other (recipi-
ent). The donor may cooperate and help the recipient at a cost c to herself/himself, conferring a
benefit b to the recipient (with b> c). The donor may also decide not to help, in which case no
one pays any costs nor distributes any benefits. In line with previous work, this donation game
characterizes the interactions between pairs of individuals in the population. We further
assume that individuals have a public reputation that can only have 2 attributes: Good (G) or
Bad (B). It is worth pointing out that, to begin with, G and B reputations are mere labels with
no a-priorimeaning. Their significance will eventually emerge in association with individual
behavior in connection with the donation game. Indeed, it is the structure of the donation
game, in which help implies engaging in a costly action to confer a higher benefit to someone
else, that ultimately assigns a meaning to the reputation labels.
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Decision is an individual attribute, encoded in a behavioral rule specified by the duple
p = (pG,pB) that defines the probability of an individual to opt for C when facing a G and a B
opponent, respectively. The reputation of each individual is public and (errors apart, see Meth-
ods) is attributed by a bystander who witnesses a pairwise interaction; in doing so, she/he identi-
fies the action (C orD) of the donor, as well as the reputation (B or G) of the recipient, based on
which she/he attributes a new reputation to the donor. To perform this task, the bystander uses
a social norm, that is, a rule that converts the combined information stemming from the action
of the donor and the reputation of the recipient into a new reputation for the donor. Social
norms encoding this type of information are classified as second-order norms [13–15,26]. In
this hierarchy, first-order norms convert the action of the donor into a new reputation for her/
him, whereas third-order norms use, besides the information used in second-order norms, the
reputation of the donor at the time of engaging in the donation game. Likewise, the complexity
of behavioral rules varies concomitantly. In the space of second order norms we shall consider
here, the duple p suffices to unambiguously define a strategy, leading to the following 4 possible
strategies: unconditional Defection (AllD,p = (0,0)), unconditional Cooperation (AllC,p = (1,1)),
Discriminator strategy (Disc,p = (1,0)), that is, cooperate with those in good standing, and defect
otherwise), and paradoxical Discriminator strategy (pDisc,p = (0,1), the opposite ofDisc).
This simplified societal structure has been very influential in studying the evolution of coop-
eration under indirect reciprocity [4,7,9,10,13–15,17–19,22,23,25–27]. Unlike previous analyti-
cal studies, however, we shall investigate the evolutionary dynamics of small-scale societies by
means of stochastic birth-death processes, monitoring explicitly to which extent a social norm
fosters cooperation.
Let us assume that all individuals start with the same reputation (say, G), and that some of
them (k Z) adopt the behavioral rule p while the rest of the population (Z-k) adopts another
behavioral rule p’. By interacting with each other, it may happen that individual reputations
change in time. If no one changes their behavioral rule, there will be a characteristic time after
which the distribution of reputations in the population will stabilize. This stable distribution
can be determined by computing the limiting distribution of the 2-dimensional Markov chain
described in the Methods section. Given a (stationary) distribution of reputations, we can com-
pute the fitness of an individual using behavioral rule p (p’) by determining the average payoff
of such an individual in the population.
Knowledge of the fitness of each type of individual in the population allows us now to study
the evolution of behavioral rules in the population. To this end we define a stochastic birth-
death process. Analytically, we shall restrict the number of behavioral rules present in the pop-
ulation, at any time, to be at most two. In other words, we assume that no new behavior rule
appears in the population before one of the 2 existing (p and p’) rules goes extinct. Such a Small
Mutation Approximation (SMA) [43], which has been employed in the past with great success
[40–45]—albeit not in the context of IR—allows us to compute, for a population under a given
social norm i) the stationary distribution of behavioral rules and, from it, ii) the cooperation
index (η, a real number between 0 and 1, defined in Methods) of that population, measuring
the average fraction of donations observed in a community evolving under a given social norm.
Computer simulations, in which all behavior rules are allowed to co-evolve, allow us to show
that the intuitive analytical results extracted from the SMA do actually remain valid in a sur-
prisingly wide parameter range (see S1 Text).
Results
In Fig 1 we calculate analytically the cooperation index (η) for different social norms as a func-
tion of (small) population size.
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Out of a total of 16 second order social norms [15], only 10 are truly distinct, and of these,
four have been given special attention: Stern-judging [14,26,33] (SJ, also known as Kandori,
which assigns a good reputation to a donor that helps a good recipient or refuses help to a bad
one, assigning a bad reputation in the other cases); Simple-Standing (SS) [5], similar to SJ, but
more “benevolent” by assigning a good reputation to any donor that cooperates; Shunning
(SH) [6,18,22], similar to SJ but less “benevolent”, by assigning a bad reputation to any donor
that defects; and Image Score [12,21] (IS, a first order norm) where all that matters is the action
of the donor, who acquires a good reputation if playing C and a bad reputation if playing D.
The results in Fig 1 show that SJ is able to foster the highest values of the cooperation index
η, independently of the (finite and small) population size. Large-scale agent-based computer
simulations confirm these results (see S1 Text).
Despite leading to cooperation index values systematically lower than SJ in small-scale soci-
eties, SS is capable of providing significant levels of cooperation. The fact that SS is more
benevolent than SJ towards unconditional cooperators prevents it from sustaining levels of
cooperation comparable to SJ in small-scale societies. Conversely, SH harms cooperation (by
being too strict compared to SJ) due to the abusive widespread assignment of bad labels. The
right balance of SJ, in turn, proves robust to variations in population size and different error
rates, as shown in Fig 2, where the robustness with respect to errors is investigated for each of
the four social norms explicitly defined in Fig 1. As also shown in Fig 1, for large populations,
the levels of cooperation obtained under SS smoothly converge to the levels obtained with SJ,
confirming these two social norms as the leading-two in promoting cooperation [15].
Fig 2 allows to further capture the robustness of each social norm in the presence of noise.
We consider errors of assignment, of execution and of private assessment.
The disadvantages of having a norm that is more (SS) or less (SH) benevolent than SJ are
highlighted by the impact that each kind of error has on it. SS benefits from assignment and
Fig 1. Cooperation index η under the influence of different social norms. Analytical results provided by
the SMA. SJ consistently leads to the highest values of the η for all community sizes. SS—the other social
norm belonging to the leading-two set [15]—supports significant levels of cooperation, yet always below the
index values attained by SJ. SH looses due to its prohibitive strictness, which may often label discretionary
individuals as bad, discouraging cooperation (see main text for details). IS performs generally worse than the
other 3, except for very small population sizes. The results regarding other norms are colored with either gray
or black; most lead to index values close to 0. The table explicitly defines each of the 4 dominant social norms
in terms of the action (C,D) of the donor and the reputation (B,G) of the recipient. Other parameters are (see
Methods for explicit definition): b = 5, c = 1,α = χ = 0.01,ε = 0.08,β = 1. The vertical dashed line indicates the
population size (Z = 50) at which the fixation probabilities and the fraction of time spent in each monomorphic
configuration were calculated and discussed later in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004709.g001
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execution errors. It happens because those specific errors allow to disambiguate between an
unconditional and a conditional cooperator. For example, in a population governed by SS and
solely composed by AllC and Disc, everyone would be regarded as G. Mistakenly failing i) to
donate (execution error) or ii) to assign a good reputation (assignment error), leads to an
increase of B individuals, providing an advantage to Disc individuals. On the contrary, the lack
of benevolence of SH is alleviated by assignment errors, as G individuals will now increase (by
mistake). Execution errors, in turn, do not promote cooperation under SH, as they act to fur-
ther increase the number of B individuals (specially in populations dominated by Disc), or to
explicitly decrease the number of donations.
While Figs 1 and 2 provide aggregate information regarding the performance of each social
norm, they do not reveal the interplay between strategies that is on the basis of the cooperation
indexes observed. Such an interplay is detailed in Fig 3, where we resort to directed graphs in
which each vertex corresponds to one of the four possible monomorphic states and respective
strategies: AllC, AllD, pDisc and Disc. The radius of each vertex corresponds to the prevalence
of each strategy in time, whereas orange/dark-gray pies represent the level of cooperation/
defection, while blue/light-gray pies display the stationary fraction of G and B reputations at
each monomorphic state. Arrows represent the fixation probabilities of one individual (with a
strategy located at the vertex of origin of the arrow) in a population of individuals (with a strat-
egy located at the vertex at the end of the arrow).
The values, computed analytically in the SMA, are only shown whenever the fixation proba-
bility is larger than neutral fixation, given by 1/Z, with values reported relative to the neutral
fixation value.
Fig 3 shows that, in accord with previous studies [13–15], all the so-called leading 2nd order
norms—SJ and SS—are able to promote Disc to an evolutionary robust strategy [46,47], defined
as strategies for which no mutant, adopting any other strategy, has a selective advantage. To
these leading 2nd order norms, one may also add SH, which, despite not being a leading norm,
can also make Disc an evolutionary robust strategy. This norm, however, is unable to support
the good standing of Disc individuals, a fact that is stressed by execution errors and alleviated
Fig 2. Effect of errors in the cooperation index η provided by different social norms. a) Assignment error (α):We allow for mistakes to happen when a
bystander attributes a new public reputation. This kind of error leverages the η in both SS and SH; b) Execution error (ε): It prevents an intended donation
act to occur. This error acts to increase the η of SS and to decrease that of SH; c) Private assessment error (χ): This error leads potential donors to perceive
the wrong reputation of the opponent and may affect both the action of a donor or the assignment of a new reputation by a bystander. Private assessment
error damages the η of all social norms. In all cases, SJ proves robust to noise, remaining the social norm that leads to the highest η. The results regarding
the remaining social norms are colored in either gray or black; mostly, these exhibit a zero value for η. The impact of each error is, in general, enhanced for
large population sizes. In particular, it can be shown that, for large populations, under low execution or assignment errors, SJ emerges as the only norm that
promotes cooperation (see S1 Text). Other parameters, when not explicitly varied, are (see Methods for explicit definition): b = 5, c = 1,α = χ = 0.01,ε = 0.08,β
= 1,Z = 60.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004709.g002
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Fig 3. Evolutionary dynamics under each norm. In each graph, each vertex represents one of all 4 possible monomorphic states; each drawn edge
represents a transition between strategies occurring above neutral drift (numbers provided are relative to neutral fixation probability 1/Z). The radius of each
node is proportional to the prevalence of the respective strategy in time. For each state, we show the fraction of cooperative/defective acts by orange/dark-
gray pie charts. Similarly, blue and light gray pies display the stationary fraction ofG andB reputations (see Table A in S1 Text for numerical values). Panel
(a) indicates that SH stabilizesDisc, yet with a majority being assigned a B reputation (light gray color) thus leading to low levels of the cooperation index η. A
different scenario emerges in panel (b) under SJ, where individuals spend most of the time in both Disc and pDisc configurations; in both cases, most
individuals cooperate. The more benevolent strategy SS, shown in panel (d), as well as the first order norm IS, shown in panel (c), are both unable to prevent
the population to spend time in AllDmonomorphic configurations. Parameters (see Methods for details): Z = 50, b = 5, c = 1, α = χ = 0.01, ε = 0.08, β = 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004709.g003
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by the assignment ones (see Fig 2). IS, in turn, is dominated by the AllD state, despite the inex-
istence of any evolutionary robust strategy. Thus, only SJ and SS are able to combine a high
prevalence of an ALL-Disc configuration with the incidence of G reputations in this configura-
tion, efficiently fostering high levels of cooperation. This said, SS cannot preclude strong transi-
tions from both AllC and pDisc into AllD, with a significant impact on the overall levels of
cooperation (see Fig 1). As a side remark, for large populations, the relative magnitude of these
two transitions is reduced in comparison with what is observed in small communities, while
the transition from AllC to Disc is strengthened, leading to the result pictured in Fig 1. The
opposite will happen for low execution errors (see S1 Text for details).
Furthermore, SJ is the only social norm that profits from the existence of a pDisc strategy.
Indeed, the population spends roughly half of the time in an ALL-pDisc configuration and the
other half in an ALL-Disc configuration. The symmetry of SJ, however, dictates that, in both
cases, individuals end up cooperating (apart from errors): cooperate and remain good in the
ALL-Disc configuration, and cooperate and remain bad in the ALL-pDisc configuration. How-
ever, as stated before, the labels G and B have no pre-determined meaning in our formulation.
What is remarkable with SJ is that it is the only social norm that successfully fosters coopera-
tion in the donation game, irrespectively of the labeling adopted. Indeed, pDisc is the equivalent
to Disc when the labels good and bad are swapped. The specific labeling, in turn, is irrelevant:
All that matters—and ultimately defines a moral system—is what is achieved through the
donation game.
Finally, but importantly, i) the advantages of SJ remain valid for different values of errors
and selection strength, and, in the presence of errors of execution, ii) such advantage is empha-
sized in small scale societies, as shown already. It is also noteworthy that the analytical results
discussed above, obtained in the limit where mutations rarely occur [43], remain valid for a
wide range of mutation probabilities, as we show explicitly in the S1 Text via comparison with
results from numerical simulations. Additionally, in the S1 Text, we also show that the analyti-
cal results remain valid for a wide interval of reputation assignment time-scales, as we abandon
the time-scale separation ansatz that sits at the heart of the analytical treatment adopted.
Discussion
We have investigated the stochastic dynamics of different strategies (behavioral rules) as a
function of population size, when reputation assignment is governed by second order social
norms. In our model, where the reputation dynamics is also the outcome of a stochastic pro-
cess, the four social norms among first and second-order norms that lead to a cooperation
index η higher than 0 are SJ, SS, SH and IS. From these, SJ clearly stands out for small popula-
tion sizes, dominating with SS for large population sizes, ensuring high values of η that are
robust to parameter variations and errors. Interestingly, the fingerprint of both leading norms
SJ and SS is consistent with recent findings showing that toddlers not only positively evaluate
those who treat others prosocially [48–51], but also positively evaluate those who behave nega-
tively towards those who have acted antisocially [50]. Moreover, in Ref. [50] it is specifically
pointed out that toddlers clearly prefer characters that harm (rather than help) antisocial pup-
pets which fits nicely with the assessment of SJ.
On the other hand, the relative importance of SS and SH depends on the amount and nature
of noise. For cases in which individuals often make errors when donating, benevolent social
norms are appropriate, and thus, SS prevails over SH. If execution errors are rare, larger popu-
lations and a larger selection pressure (high β) allows SH to prevail over SS, and benevolent
social norms become less capable of promoting cooperation. SS and IS, in turn, benefit from
noise, as is the case when populations are very small or when the exploration rate μ is large.
Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies
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Clearly, to assess the effect of a particular social norm regarding the promotion of cooperation
in a finite population, it is not enough to require the evolutionary stability or robustness of the
discriminating strategy (Disc), as addressed in previous works on IR [9,15]. When population
sizes grow from 5 to 130, a range that includes typical community sizes of hunter-gatherer socie-
ties, and in which one expects stochastic effects to play a sizable role, we find that, under SS, SH
and SJ, Disc is evolutionary robust [46,47]. However, for cooperation to emerge, strategies and
reputations must be coordinated: under SH, and despite the prevalence of theDisc strategy, defec-
tion still prevails over cooperation since individuals are mostly regarded as B; SS, in turn, fails to
prevent transitions into AllD in small populations; SJ fosters an ideal coordination between strat-
egy and prevailing reputations, leading individuals to cooperate in the donation game.
The framework developed here has the advantage of being naturally extendable to social
norms of higher order. Research carried out to date led to the discovery of SJ in a multi-level
selection model in which an exhaustive search was carried out in the space of all third order
norms [10,26]. Thus, it would not be surprising if SJ still promotes cooperation when this for-
malism is extended to third order norms. Work along these lines is in progress.
Methods
Actions conditioned to reputations
The actions employed in each interaction depend on the known reputation of the opponent. In a
world of binary reputations (Good, G or Bad, B), the strategy (also called action or behavioral
rule) used by each player is a 2-bit string that prescribes an action (C orD) given the reputation
of the opponent (G or B). Following the notation in [13–15], we denote a strategy by the duple
p = (pG,pB), in which pG and pB represent, respectively, the probability of cooperating when the
opponent isG or B. There are thus 4 different strategies: (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0) which are tra-
ditionally called AllC, paradoxical Discrimination (pDisc), Discrimination (Disc), and AllD [15].
We consider the existence of execution errors (ε) that simulate the inability of individuals to
act in the way that their strategy dictates [11]. It is common practice to consider errors in the
form of failed intended cooperation [15,31], due, for instance, the lack of “resources, time or
energy” to donate [52]. Our results, however, remain valid even if the execution error would
also induce defectors to involuntarily cooperate.
Reputation dynamics
We assume that the donation game described in the main text is observed by a third party that
will update the reputation of the players according to a social norm that is common to the
entire population. The social norms prescribe a new reputation to a potential donor given
the action employed (C or D) and the reputation of the opponent (the potential receiver of
the donation). These second order social norms are defined as a bit-string with length 4,
d = (dG,C,dG,D,dB,C,dB,D), in which di,j denotes the probability of assigning a good reputation to
an individual that employed action j towards an opponent with reputation i.
There are 16 different second order social norms [15], which reduce to 10 if we take into
consideration that the labels B and G can be swapped and the same results would ensue. In
other words, norms d1 = (dG,C,dG,D,dB,C,dB,D) and d2 = (1-dB,C,1-dB,D,1-dG,C,1-dG,D) are equiva-
lent due to a mirror symmetry [13].
We consider the existence of assignment errors, α [14]. They model the fact that the
bystander observing the interaction may fail to attribute an accurate reputation to the donor,
due to a myopic assess of the reputation of the potential receiver or due to a misinterpretation
of the action employed. Following [10,13,14,22,23,26], and given that we are dealing with small
communities, we assume that, once the reputation of an individual is assigned, it is widely and
Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies
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faithfully disseminated throughout the population, so that everyone shares the same opinion
regarding the reputation of others.
Update of reputations
In the SMA, we assume a maximum of two strategies (p and p') to be present, at any time, in
the population. We assume that p already includes the execution error (i.e., p!(1−ε)p) and d
already includes the assignment error (i.e., d!(1–2α)d+α). There are private errors, occurring
with a probability χ, in assessing the actual reputation of an opponent. Consequently, denoting
X = (1−χ,χ) and Χ = (χ,1−χ), the probability that someone using strategy p cooperates when
meeting a good opponent is given by CpG ¼ ð1 wÞpG þ wpB ¼ X:pT , and the probability of
cooperating with a bad opponent is given by CpB ¼ wpG þ ð1 wÞpB ¼ X :pT . The probability
that one observer assigns a good reputation to an individual using p and interacting with a good
opponent is given by
GpG ¼ ð1 wÞðCpGdG;C þ ð1 CpGÞdG;DÞ þ wðCpGdB;C þ ð1 CpGÞdB;DÞ ¼ ðX  ðCpG; 1 CpGÞÞ  dT
where is the Kronecker product ((a1,a2)(b1,b2) = (a1b1,a1b2,a2b1,a2b2)). The probability of
assigning a good reputation to an individual using p and interacting with a bad opponent is
given by GpB ¼ ðX  ðCpB; 1 CpBÞÞ  dT .
Given the expressions above, we now define birth and death probabilities [53] for good indi-
viduals. We use h and h’ to denote the number of good individuals using strategies p and p’. For
a population with size Z, where k individuals use strategy p (and Z-k use p’), the probability of
having one more good individual using strategy p is given by,
Hþp ðh; h0Þ ¼
k h
Z
ðhþ h
0
Z  1 G
p
G þ
Z  h h0  1
Z  1 G
p
BÞ
whereas the probability of having one more bad individual using strategy p is given by,
Hp ðh; h0Þ ¼
h
Z
ðhþ h
0  1
Z  1 ð1 G
p
GÞ þ
Z  h h0
Z  1 ð1 G
p
BÞÞ
with analogous expressions for the birth and death probabilities associated with good individu-
als using the strategy p’ (i.e. the expressionsHþ
p0 andH

p0 ). To that end, one only has to substi-
tute k for Z-k, h for h’ and p for p’.
For a fixed value of k, the expressionsHþp ,H

p ,H
þ
p0 ,H

p0 deﬁne the stochastic process with
which we may evolve the reputation dynamics in the population. Indeed, those probabilities
deﬁne a two-dimensional Markov chain whose states, (h,h’), are deﬁned by the number of good
individuals using strategies p and p’. In total, there are S = (k+1)(Z-k+1) different states. The
entry (i,j) of the underlying transition matrix (H) represents the transition probability from
state ðhi; h0iÞ to state ðhj; h0jÞ. Consequently, the entries of matrix H are given by
Hi;j
Hþp ðhi; h0iÞ; hj ¼ hi þ 1 ^ h0j ¼ h0i
Hp ðhi; h0iÞ; hj ¼ hi  1 ^ h0j ¼ h0i
Hþ
p0 ðhi; h0iÞ; hj ¼ hi ^ h0j ¼ h0i þ 1
H
p0 ðhi; h0iÞ; hj ¼ hi ^ h0j ¼ h0i  1
H¼ðhi; h0iÞ; i ¼ j
0; otherwhise
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
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where
H¼ðhi; h0iÞ ¼ 1 Hþp ðhi; h0iÞ  Hp ðhi; h0iÞ  Hþp0 ðhi; h0iÞ  Hp0 ðhi; h0iÞ
is the probability of keeping the same reputation distribution.
From H, one can now compute the stationary (or limiting) distribution σ, defined as the
eigenvector of matrix H, associated with eigenvalue 1 [54],
sH ¼ s
Update of strategies
The evolution of strategies in the population is determined by a birth death process with imi-
tation [55], in which those strategies that fare better are imitated more often [56,57]. This
probabilistic imitation (i.e., the probability of strategy p being imitated by an individual previ-
ously adopting p', P(p'!p) is accomplished through the Fermi (also known as pairwise com-
parison) update rule [55,58], Pðp0 ! pÞ ¼ 1=ð1þ ebDfp;p0 Þ, where Dfp;p0 ðkÞ ¼ f pðkÞ  f p0 ðkÞ is
the difference of average ﬁtness between p and p’ and β controls the selection strength: when-
ever β!0 imitation approximates the neutral drift; on the other hand, whenever β!+1 the
imitation occurs deterministically and selection pressure is maximal. To this end we compute
the average payoff (ﬁtness) of individuals employing a given strategy in the following way:
The frequency-dependent ﬁtness of strategy p, when k individuals are using it (and thereby
Z-k are using p’), is composed by two terms: one positive corresponding to the received bene-
ﬁt (b), and another negative that translates the donations made (c) when individuals using p
cooperate: fp(k,h,h') = bRp(h,h')−cDp(h,h'). Rp(h,h’) stands as the probability that a p strategist
receives a donation,
Rpðh; h0Þ ¼
h
k
ðk 1
Z  1C
p
G þ
Z  k
Z  1C
p0
G Þ þ
k h
k
ðk 1
Z  1C
p
B þ
Z  k
Z  1C
p0
B Þ
Dp(h,h’), in turn, stands as the probability that a p donates,
Dpðh; h0Þ ¼
h
k
ðh 1þ h
0
Z  1 C
p
G þ
Z  h h0
Z  1 C
p
BÞ þ
k h
k
ðhþ h
0
Z  1 C
p
G þ
Z  h 1 h0
Z  1 C
p
BÞ
Provided a distribution of reputations σ is known, the average fitness is then calculated as
f pðkÞ ¼
X
0<h<k
X
0<h0<Zk
sh;h0 fpðk; h; h0Þ, where σh,h' = σh(Z−k+1)+h') is the stationary distribution over
the state in which there are h and h’ individuals labeled G and using, respectively, action rules p
and p’.
Small-mutation approximation (SMA)
The fixation probability (ρp'!p) of a unique mutant p in a population where Z-1 individuals use
p’ can be written [4,53,55,59],
rp0!p ¼ ð1þ
XZ1
i¼1
Yi
j¼1
TðjÞ
TþðjÞÞ
1
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Using the pairwise comparison rule (introduced above) to model the probability of imita-
tion [55] this expression simplifies to
rp0!p ¼ ð1þ
XZ1
i¼1
Yi
j¼1
ebDfp;p0 Þ1
With these deﬁnitions for the ﬁxation probabilities, we setup now an embedded Markov chain
whose state-space is composed by all the possible monomorphic states,
Ti;j ¼
ri!j
3
ði 6¼ jÞTi;i ¼ 1
X3
k¼1;k6¼i
ri!k
3
Following a procedure similar to that employed in the derivation of the stationary distribu-
tion of reputations, the stationary distribution of strategies is unique to the extent that the
underlying Markov chain is irreducible, and given again by the eigenvector associated with the
eigenvalue 1 of the transition matrix [41,45,54]).
Cooperation index
The cooperation index (η) is computed, for a given social norm, by taking the weighted average
of the fraction of cooperative acts that take place in each of the monomorphic configurations of
the population; for weights, we use the fraction of time the population spends in each of these
configurations, provided by the stationary distribution of strategies. Denoting by λpi the fraction
of time spent in the monomorphic configuration where all individuals adopt pi, and denoting by
σd(pi,h) the probability of having h good individuals within the monomorphic configuration pi
(calculated with d as the underlying social norm), the cooperation index (η) is given by
Z ¼
X
pi2fAllC;AllD;Disc;pDiscg
lpi
XZ
j¼0
Dpiðj; 0Þsdðpi; jÞ
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